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Abstract: 
The article offers a reinterpretation of the current economic and political crisis through the lens 
of Gramsci’s concept of ‘interregnum’. Breaking with the model of ‘punctured equilibrium’, 
interregnum is used to analyze the specific political dynamics of non-hegemonic periods that lie 
between the breakdown of one ideological order and the emergence of a new. While political 
science has a set of different theories about periods of hegemony and paradigmatic stability, 
these periods between stable hegemonies remain distinctly undertheorized. The article offers a 
theoretical concept for describing periods of interregnum and applies it to the changes in 
economic ideology and political alignments that followed the breakdown of the liberal order in 
the interwar period and the post-war Keynesian consensus in the 1970s. Following this, the 
article applies the concept to the current conjuncture, where the hegemony of neoliberalism is 
shaken after the 2008 financial crisis, but no clear successor has emerged. 
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Ten years after the 2008 financial crisis, the Western world is still in a situation of turmoil and 
political instability. Since 2011, we have seen a wave of anti-establishment discontent from the 
left and right, manifesting itself in protest movements and electoral campaigns. The rise of left 
and right anti-establishment figures, from Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen to Pablo Iglesias 
and Jeremy Corbyn, has led to a significant weakening of the political establishment throughout 
the world.  
At the same time, the global economic elite seems to harbor growing doubts about the economic 
orthodoxies. The annual summit of the World Economic Forum in Davos is now discussing 
inequality and political instability every year, and even traditional bastions of neoliberal 
orthodoxy such as the IMF or OECD have started warning against inequality and advocating for 
greater public spending. Neoliberalism might not have lost its position in the day-to-day 
formulation of policy, but the days of undisputed common sense seem to have gone. While old 
certainties are crumbling, however, there is no clear sign of a new order emerging out of the 
chaos and turbulence 
This unclear situation is mirrored in the intellectual debate around the current politics, where 
every month seems to bring new books heralding the demise of democracy or the liberal order1, 
without any clear consensus of what is to follow. Within scholarly research, this uncertainty has 
been mirrored in two distinct waves of literature on the political impact of the crisis. In the years 
immediately following the 2008 financial crisis, there was widespread anticipation that it would 
mean the end of the ideational hegemony of economic liberalism that had characterized the 
period since the 1980s.  
The first wave of scholarship on the crisis tended to emphasize this expectation: As the material 
and ideological foundations of neoliberalism were shattered, we were witnessing the beginning 
of the end of neoliberal hegemony2. The idea of the collapse of neoliberalism was based on the 
apparent contradiction of the doctrines by the massive government interventions with bank 
packages and the creation of state credit and guarantees. This view was further strengthened by 
the apparent return to Keynesian countercyclical policies in many countries in the years 
immediately following the crisis3. However, this short ‘Keynesian window’ of 2008-9 quickly 
closed. As it became clear that the largesse shown in the bailout packages to the banks would not 
be shared with the unemployed, a new dominant narrative emerged: the persistence of 
neoliberalism, despite the crisis. The main theme of the literature now shifted to explain the 
persistence, or non-death of neoliberal ideology and policies4.  
This paper offers an alternative to both these waves of literature through an engagement with 
Gramsci’s concept of the interregnum, from the oft-cited but seldom analysed quote about the 
situation where ‘the old is dying, but the new cannot be born’. By abandoning the expectation 
that we have already seen the resolution of the crisis, the article will use the concept of the 
interregnum to describe the current era as one of sustained political crisis and confusion, with the 
old hegemonic equilibrium shattered, but no new hegemonic project able to take over. A 
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situation parallel to the interwar period that Gramsci described in Prison’s Notebooks, and the 
instability of the 1970’s. By using Gramscian political economy to combine the economic and 
political level, the article will develop a theoretical framework for understanding the complex 
interplay between economics and politics in sustained periods of non-hegemony.   
The article begins a look at the understanding of crisis within political economy and political 
science literature and the problems in the widely used metaphor of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ in 
section 1. Section 2 outlines a theoretical model of interregnum with inspirations from Gramsci, 
as well as Jessop and the Neo-Gramscian tradition. Section 3 will then discusses the alternations 
between interregnum and hegemonic equilibrium in the 20th century. Section 4 will discuss the 
analytical consequences of looking at the post-2008 world as an interregnum, before in section 5 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
Transcending the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model  
The concept of the interregnum offers a new way of looking at the impact of crisis on structural 
change in the political economy. The idea of crises as turning points, whatever the concrete 
theoretical formulations, is generally associated with a model of punctuated equilibria, a model 
borrowed from paleontology5. The central idea behind this metaphor is that history does not 
move forward at a steady pace, but instead in plateaus of stability punctuated by short periods of 
rapid change, in which the conditions are created for a new equilibrium to emerge. A similar 
model can be seen in Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific paradigms, where periods of stable 
paradigms allow normal science to go on, punctuated by sudden periods of scientific revolutions6  
This model can be found in several theoretical traditions of political economy. In the Marxist and 
regulation school tradition, capitalist crises stand as central pillars in the transition from one 
mode of regulation or form of capitalism to another7.  In the institutionalist tradition, especially 
historical intuitionalism, there has been a decade-long theoretical debate about the role of crisis-
driven sudden change and forms of incremental change8.  
There are, however, some problems with the model of punctuated equilibrium. In its very nature, 
punctuations must constitute relatively short and unusual periods. This sometimes happens in 
history—revolutions, coups, or war can really be ‘weeks where decades happen’, where regimes 
change overnight. When it comes to studying the impacts of economic crises, however, this does 
not seem to be typical. Instead, the punctuations between periods of equilibria seem rather long. 
It was not until 1945 that the hegemony of Keynesianism found its institutional form, more than 
15 years after the onset of Great Depression. Moreover, it took almost a decade from the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971 until the neoliberal revolution emerged in force in the 
early 1980s. Such periods of confusion are not trivial in comparison to the historical periods of 
hegemonic equilibrium: 25 years of Keynesianism hegemony in the post-war era, 25 years of 
neoliberalism before the 2008 crisis. What follows the breakdown of ideological hegemony 
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generally does not seem to be a fully-fledged new system of hegemony. Instead, we see a 
prolonged period of confusion and political chaos. It is exactly these periods of confusion that 
can be labelled an interregnum. These periods of interregnum cannot be conceptualized as mere 
transitions but must be understood as periods in their own right.  
By engaging with Gramsci’s concept in its theoretical and historical context, this article will try 
to develop a systematic concept of interregnum and demonstrate how this can cast new light over 
the historical shifts between different periods of hegemonic equilibrium.  
An interregnum may be defined as a period of uncertainty, confusion, and disagreement among 
the dominant elite, and where former ideologies, while still having institutional power, are losing 
traction, leading to disagreement and disorientation. In such a fluctuating landscape, 
governments still must react. The orthodoxies of former times are still dominant in the 
bureaucracies and apparatuses of the state, but at the same time, the traditional institutions are no 
longer as effective as they once were. In the periods of interregnum, several ideologically 
conflicting hegemonic projects struggle for potential hegemony, each with its own solution to the 
crisis of the previous system. Despite their historical weight, these periods of interregnum are 
distinctly undertheorized in the literature. Might periods of institutional and ideational confusion 
be characterized not only by an absence of hegemony and consensus but also have dynamics that 
need to be appreciated on their own terms? Instead of the tacit assumption that periods of stable 
hegemony are the ‘normal’ state of capitalist economies, we might have to accept that we inhabit 
a world where hegemonic equilibrium is not the norm.  
While drawing on the substantial literature on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and crisis that have 
been developed in recent decades, this article nevertheless makes several contributions to the 
literature. Primarily, the concept of the interregnum offers a new theoretical tool for 
understanding the current conjuncture and the lengthy drawn-out processes that generally follow 
the breakdown of an ideational hegemony, specifying some common dynamics that have 
characterized such periods historically. Here the concept of crisis, with its notion of urgency and 
resolution, does not seem adequate.  In his work on the conceptual history of the term, Reinhardt 
Koselleck describes how crisis, originally derived from medicine, signified a turning point, a 
“definitive, irrevocable decision.”9. The concept Interregnum is different here, in that it has no 
tendency for resolution, but can rather continue for expanded periods of time. This means the 
article seeks to redefine and nuance the idea of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ that dominates much of 
the thinking on crisis and regime change held within both political science and political 
economy.  
Secondly, the article represents the first systematic attempt at operationalizing Gramsci’s concept 
of interregnum. By putting Gramsci’s definition of the interregnum in context with the broader 
themes in Gramsci’s theoretical work, as well as later writers in the tradition, the article will 
argue that it is possible to develop a fruitful analytical concept of the situation of a capitalist 
economy without functioning ideological hegemony. The concept of the interregnum developed 
5 
 
out of this process speaks not only to the neo-Gramscian literature but broader questions in 
historically oriented social science. By focusing on the temporally substantial periods of 
hegemonic struggle and the unsuccessful hegemonic projects, the concept draws attention to the 
openness and contingency of historical process, rather than the teleological perspectives that can 
easily follow when only telling the story of the rise of successful hegemonic projects without 
considering the alternatives.  
 
A Theory of the interregnum 
The notion of interregnum is originally a monarchical term denoting the gap periods between the 
death of one regent and the ascension of the next. In a theoretical context, Antonio Gramsci first 
developed the idea. In his Prison Notebooks, as a part of his analysis of the state and creation of 
hegemony, he speaks of the interregnum as defined by a ‘crisis of authority’:  
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” but only “dominant”, 
exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become 
detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to 
believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and 
the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear10.  
Gramsci’s pithy quote has been quoted widely, but, as Gramsci never fully developed his 
thoughts on the interregnum into a fully-fledged theory, the notion has rarely been discussed in 
depth within political economy literature. The best attempt in this direction has probably been 
made by Stephen Gill, who briefly touches on the concept in his works on disciplinary 
neoliberalism and organic crisis in the 1990s11.  
 
In recent years, however, several writers have started to use the concept of interregnum to 
characterize the current moment. In her recent book on left populism, Chantal Mouffe uses the 
Interregnum as the description of the conjuncture in which the rise of left populism takes place12. 
In a 2010 article on the perspectives of a new Bretton Woods system, Eric Helleiner uses the 
concept in a model of the establishment of a new global financial system13. In 2012, Zygmunt 
Bauman employs the concept to denote the general condition of crisis in Western societies 
caused by economic crisis, climate crisis, and migration14, while Wolfgang Streeck in recent 
How will Capitalism End? talks of how we are in a ‘post-capitalist interregnum’, signaling the 
coming breakdown of the capitalist order15.  
While these authors all quote Gramsci, there has so far been few attempts to think systematically 
about what the concept of interregnum signify within the broader themes of Gramsci’s works. 
This requires some reconstructive work, as Gramsci never developed his idea of the interregnum 
theoretically16. To develop it into an analytical concept therefore requires putting Gramsci’s 
definition of the interregnum in context with the broader themes in his theoretical work and 
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political time, as well as later writers within Gramscian and neo-Marxist theory. This does, of 
course, imply going well beyond Gramsci’s own work and as such, I do not claim any sort of 
authoritative reading of the Prison Notebooks or Gramsci’s original political and theoretical 
intentions. The aim of the article is solely to develop the concept as an analytical tool, and I will 
argue that it is possible to develop Gramsci’s observations into a fruitful analytical concept of the 
situation of a capitalist economy without a functioning ideological hegemony.  
The theoretical concept of the interregnum, like the concept of crisis, does not in itself contain 
any geographical or historical specification. The way it is applied in this article is focused on the 
developed capitalist democracies of Western Europe and North America, described by Kees van 
der Pijl as the Atlantic World17. The temporality and periodization would obviously be different, 
if the focus had been on other regions as the Global South, or the emerging markets of East Asia. 
However, as these countries form the core of the capitalist world economy, political 
developments here of course have global consequences. The historical scope of the analysis, 
running though the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries, does not imply the ambition of 
providing a comprehensive analysis of the actors or structure of the global system. , The article 
does draw, however, inspiration from such undertaking, such as Giovanni Arrighi’s work on 
shifting hegemons18, or Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin’s on central the role of the American state 
in the shaping of global capitalism19. The use of history in this article should rather be as a 
medium through which the conceptual work is developed.  
 
Organic crisis 
The concept of the interregnum in Gramsci’s work is tied to the idea of the organic crisis. This is 
the notion that the ruling class has lost its ideological and political legitimacy and is, therefore, 
unable to provide the moral and ideological leadership that can secure hegemony. The organic 
crisis is not only an economic crisis but also a wider political and ideological crisis of 
legitimation that reveals ‘incurable structural contradictions’ of the political order20. The 
interregnum can thus be seen as the political form of an organic crisis.  
An interregnum does not imply lack of order, but rather a semi-ordered system. There is no total 
confusion out of which emerges a new fully formed system of hegemony but, instead, a period of 
competition between different strategies backed by different alliances, potential or realized, of 
social forces. The concept of interregnum points to the natural integration of periods of greater 
confusion in the functioning of capitalist economies. Stuart Hall lays out the difference between 
the organic and conjunctural aspects of crisis21. Conjunctural aspects of crisis imply urgency. It 
is a state of exception where a political order is either able to overcome the crisis or is thrust into 
terminal decline. In contrast, a period of organic crisis has no such urgency or any sharp 
temporal boundaries. While the period is characterized by the dysfunction of central institutions 
that previously managed to keep economic and political contradictions in check, there is no 
necessary drive towards a solution of the situation, as long as several viable political and 
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economic strategies exist. This process is not necessarily fast; Gramsci describes it as lasting for 
decades.  
 
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that 
incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, 
despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing 
structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to 
overcome them22  
While the organics crisis is often tied to economic troubles, there is no mechanistic connection 
between the two. An economic crisis might translate into political crisis, but it is also possible for 
the system to overcome an economic crisis within the hegemonic strategy. It is quite possible to 
speak of a relatively significant economic crisis in the early 1990s in the US and Europe or after 
the Dot.com bubble in 2000 without triggering any political crisis. At the same time, the growth 
and unemployment rates of the 1970s, which plunged the political ruling elites into a deep crisis 
of legitimation, would be considered magnificently fine in the 2008 world or even in the 1990s 
for most countries. 
The ‘morbid symptoms’ Gramsci points to as characterizing the interregnum are associated with 
the loss of faith in the governing ideologies and thus the loss of the main legitimating 
instruments available to the governing elite of the state. The loss of ideological cohesion can be 
seen not only in popular ideological disaffection, but also inside the dominant ‘political forces 
which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure’23 Such a twin legitimation 
crisis, where the political elite faces not only loss of public support but also internal ideological 
divisions, leads to deep political dysfunction. In contrast, a well-functioning political order is 
capable of small scale adjustment to changing circumstances, within the acceptable bounds of the 
ruling ideological hegemony—rules that are effectively de-politicized. However, when the 
political elite is weakened and fractured, such low-tension, de-politicized policy changes 
becomes harder, and the system faces a situation of gridlock as several competing strategies offer 
differing solutions, with none of them able to emerge as hegemonic.  
Gramsci and the interwar Interregnum:  
In Gramsci’s work, we can find the kernel of an analysis of the ongoing unravelling of the liberal 
world order that emerged out of the First World War riddled with crisis.  
Gramsci never looked upon this liberal economic order as merely the necessary political 
superstructure of capitalism but, instead, as a specific state form or political regime. In his 
critique of ‘economism’ as a reductionism that ignores the political and ideological changes, he 
describes the laissez-faire system that dominated the pre-war capitalist world as an inherently 
political and ideological form of state power that was an expression of a certain way of 
regulating the capitalist order via the state as an apparatus  
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Laissez-faire too is a form of State ‘regulation’, introduced and maintained by legislative 
and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the 
spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts24.  
In this time, however, this order was in the process of disintegration. His fragment of the 
interregnum, written in the notebooks from 1932-34, is formulated on the background of the 
inability of this pre-war liberal order to establish a stable hegemony in the interwar years—
alienated from the mass of the population and torn with internal division, the ruling class were 
unable to regain leadership of the situation25 In this situation Gramsci noted ‘highly favorable 
conditions’ for the Marxist movement he was a part of, but he also outlined other alternative 
solutions to the crisis-bound system.  
One of these could be seen as the rise of fascism or Caesarism. Caesarism26 is described as 
resulting from a situation in which the equality of competing class forces means that no coherent 
historical bloc can be constructed.27 In such a situation of deadlock, a charismatic individual can 
assume power by way of reconfiguring class forces and serving as a compromise between 
otherwise antagonistic forces.  
The analysis of Caesarism is evidently aimed primarily at the rise of Mussolini and fascism, 
although Gramsci was not able to describe this directly due to prison censorship. However, he 
does include other autocratic figures such as Napoleon and Bismarck in the category.  
Caesarism (…) expresses the particular solution in which a great personality is entrusted 
with the task of ‘arbitration’ over a historico-political situation characterised by an 
equilibrium of forces heading towards catastrophe28.  
In the US, Gramsci saw another potential future project emerging in the form of Fordism. With 
the term Fordism, originally probably used as a way of avoiding censure of terms like advanced 
or late capitalism29, Gramsci denoted the construction of a new form of industrial organization of 
capitalism, where mass production was combined with mass consumption and high wages, as 
well as a new centrality of finance capital, instead of the old capitalist plutocracy30. These 
technological and organizational developments were coupled with a new political regime with a 
much larger role for the state as a guarantor of a stability unknown in the earlier, laissez-faire 
form of capitalism, primarily through full employment policies.  
Posthumously, it is clear to see some of the outline of the embedded liberalism of the post-war 
period in Gramsci’s writing on Fordism. The consolidation of the post-war world order did not 
materialize before his death in 1937, and in his notebooks, he leaves open ‘the question of 
whether Americanism (Fordism) can constitute a historical epoch’31.  
While he outlined three different solutions to the crisis of the interwar interregnum, there were 
also clear differences for him. He saw the Marxist labor movement ultimately overcoming the 
contradictions of capitalism while the other hegemonic projects he outlined as potentialities in 
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his present—Fordism/Americanism and Caesarism/Fascism—did not do this. He offered, 
instead, a reconfiguration of the capitalist economy through the means of the state. It is this later 
version we will develop further in the following.  
Hegemonic projects 
The concept of interregnum is inevitably tied to the idea of hegemony, that is, the ability of the 
ruling class to rule through the consent of the ruled. While a rich literature on the concept of 
hegemony exists32, this paper will follow Bob Jessop’s development of the Gramscian idea of 
economic hegemony as laid out in The Future of the Capitalist State. Here he states that 
‘economic hegemony exists where a given accumulation strategy is the basis for an 
institutionalized compromise between opposing social forces’. This project involves 
‘constructing an imagined “general economic interest”’33.  
To establish economic hegemony, whether by factions of capital or cross-class compromise, it is 
necessary to formulate a Hegemonic Project, not only to provide an accumulation strategy, but 
also a ‘State Form’, that is, a notion of the regulation and form of the state, including its role in 
the broader economy34. In this context, one can further define a hegemonic project as requiring a 
coherent economic paradigm or set of ideas for governing the economy combined with a set of 
policies capable of translating these ideas into political practice and enforce them despite 
opposition. (See tables C and D) In modern liberal democracies, this means that the ability to 
govern is tied to the ability to mobilize sufficient electoral backing as well as consent from the 
most important social forces. As Wesley Widmaier states in his recent book Economic Ideas in 
Political Times35, the early phase of such hegemonic projects is often characterized by so-called 
‘interpretive leaders’ who can formulate a coherent project that embodies ‘the general economic 
interest’ on a normative and political level. Examples are Keynes in the 1930s or Friedman in the 
1960s. Later, if the project is successful, these overall normative ideas become institutionalized 
into new sets of institutions, as the Bretton Woods-system, or a reconfiguration of existing 
institutions, as the Washington consensus under the neoliberal period.  
Hegemony, of course, does not mean the total consensus of society. Any modern capitalist 
society has anti-systemic, oppositional forces intent on deep structural changes. However, as 
long as these are kept under control, and there is a consensus among a governing elite, with a 
sufficiently broad social basis, this does not hinder the stable running of the system. For 
Gramsci, the production of hegemony is never ‘free’ for the dominant groups. He describes how 
‘the fact of hegemony presupposes that the interests and tendencies of those groups over whom 
hegemony is exercised have been taken into account, and that a certain equilibrium is 
established “36. As such, the dominant group must be given something, however small, to secure 
acquiescence.  
There are generally two ways of controlling these dissenting forces. Either through co-optation, 
where they are subsumed under the hegemonic consensus, or marginalization, where they are 
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effectively excluded from power. Co-optation can be seen as the involvement of trade unions in 
policy formation in most Western European countries in the post-war era, or in Scandinavia 
today. Marginalization can be seen in the exclusion of the communist parties of southern Europe 
in the same period, or in the attitude of trade unions in most Western countries in the neoliberal 
era. As long as one of these mechanisms are in place, it is possible to secure a state of consensus 
amongst the governing elite.  
 
Elites and ideology  
A problem in the Gramscian formulation of the ‘crisis of authority’ is that it is traditionally 
conceptualized only as a dialectic between the popular masses and the ruling class. However, 
across large parts of the neo-Gramscian tradition, especially its Amsterdam school, there are also 
elite dynamics inside the ruling bloc with different factions of capital and other groups 
organizing a coherent bloc through powerful networks37.  
The question of the ruling elite leads us to the question of ideology. In the Marxist tradition, the 
question of ideology is often framed in terms of persuading the general population of the 
legitimacy of the system38. This does not exhaust the function of ideology, however. Elites also 
need ideas and ideology to ensure internal cohesion. For navigating in a world in which the 
future is uncertain, it is necessary to form a historical bloc. What is important in this context is 
that we are not just looking at popular common sense, as laid out by Stuart Hall39, but also an 
elite common sense, a constructed consensus around a set of ideological beliefs the acceptance of 
which forms the basis of coalition building. 
The acceptance of the existence of elite common sense means the denial of the existence of an 
internal secret sphere of cynical reasoning where only profits and interest rein. There is no 
neoclassical rational actor inside the global capitalist class, only politically mediated actions. The 
exact character of who is included and excluded from the ruling coalition of the elite is specific 
to the formation of the concrete historical bloc. In practice, this means that the elite is comprised 
of parties that have access to shape government policy within the current system and the 
organized form of the most important capital factions.  
This situation points to the political character and importance of ruling coalitions. The elite, as 
employed in this article, pertains not only to the classical ruling class of Marxist theory40, but 
also includes the state elite, experts (to the extent they are included as organic intellectuals) and 
possibly even labor unions. In many countries, the business community deserted the compromise 
bloc of the post-war period in the 1970s to raise profit rates through a more conflictual course. 
Economic ideas are important here as a way of expressing economic interests as universal 
interests of the entire society. For such a strategy to be effective, there needs to be a functional 
consensus of this within a stable, coherent elite representing a sufficiently broad base of social 
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forces. Such a consensus can be brought about either through a persuasion of all relevant factions 
to the same economic strategy or through an exclusion of opposing social forces from access to 
the elite. The specific configuration of included parties/social forces in a ruling bloc is 
conditioned on the organization of the hegemony. This means that, in post-war Scandinavia, 
central unions and the social democrats were central parts of the historical bloc,41 while both 
unions and the communists were excluded in post-war France. The successful realization of 
hegemony also means the ability of the ruling coalition to transform the institutional setup 
gradually in response to changing national or global circumstances.  
Interregnums are periods in which such an elite consensus is lacking, and thus no hegemonic 
strategy emerges. A modern version Gramsci’s notion of interregnum can thus usefully be 
reframed as a situation in which an old institutional order still exists, but is not able to deliver the 
previous stability. The interregnum is not defined by a lack of ideological projects, but rather 
with several competing strategies that all have sufficient backing in society. As such, no single 
hegemonic project can gain sufficient consensus within the elite. The period of interregnum thus 
occurs with the advent of a crisis of the established economic and ideological order and ends 
when one of the strategies for the solution of the crisis is declared the victor and a new 
hegemony is established. All this leads us to an understanding in which the lack of hegemony 
should not be understood as an anomaly but as a natural state for a capitalist society. There is no 
natural tendency towards equilibrium or hegemony.  
 
Interregnums and the state  
Hegemony for Gramsci involves the state and is, in this way, an essentially political concept. 
However, Gramsci has an expanded version of the state which includes both political and 
coercive institutions as well as consensual and ideological institutions. He describes the state as 
‘hegemony protected by the armor of coercion42. Furthermore, the state has a paradoxical 
placement in a wider social order. As Bob Jessop explains, it is at once only one of the 
institutions amongst others in the social order, and on the other hand, it is charged with 
maintaining the overall cohesion of the social order43. It is exactly this placement of the state in 
the overall social order that makes it a pivotal center in the formulation of projects to reform 
economy and society.   
In periods of hegemonic equilibrium, the different social forces in society are in some ways fixed 
into place by a dominant understanding of the economy and society, and the state can thus take 
on a function of one among many other institutions. In times of uncertainty, however, the 
balance of social forces is no longer fixed, and the state can take on a pivotal role. As the state is 
the privileged site for a redefinition of the social order, the political issue of state power takes on 
an even more central role in the interregnum. While the alternations of different parties in 
government plays only a minor role in periods of hegemonic equilibrium, where the main lines 
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of political acceptability are shared amongst the governing elite, political parties become central 
arenas and actors of new forms of contention in the interregnum, as they are the potential centers 
for new economic strategies and of realignment of coalitions of social forces. This was the case 
with the UK Conservative Party under Thatcher in the 1970s and the US Democrats during the 
New Deal. Where electoral politics are of minor importance in periods of hegemonic 
equilibrium,44 the interregnum sees elections take on potentially crucial significance.  
In the integrated capitalist world market, the roots of economic crises often take place on a 
global scale, whereas the political consequences still play out mainly on a national level, with 
emerging. As such, in the integrated world economy of the 20th century, the underlying 
conditions for the interregnum, political as well as economic, are global, but the concrete 
political developments and realignment of social forces play out in variegated ways in different 
national and regional settings.  
Of course, here, the specific outcome in one country is interacting with others. This can happen 
through market pressures, via trade, investment flows, financial and bond markets, and so forth 
or political pressure through international institutions. The US government has had an especially 
central role in the organization of global capitalism in the post-war period, where its Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve Bank played a key role as guarantors of both American and 
global capital45. 
 
Operationalizing the concept of the interregnum 
As a way of operationalizing the ideas outlined above, I propose a concept of interregnum with 
four main elements. : 1) absence of a stable consensus, 2) presence of competing economic 
strategies, 3) institutional continuity but decreased effectiveness of key institutions, and 4) 
realignment of social forces. These points are outlined in Table A and they are developed further 
in the following.  
Temporally, an interregnum begins when a crisis for the previously hegemonic regime becomes 
so severe that the prevailing methods for exclusion of alternatives breaks down. As such the 
presence of competing strategies are not in itself sufficient, if the hegemonic regime can 
maintain the ability to marginalize and exclude them. It is only when these mechanism break 
downs, and cohesion in the governing coalition breaks down, we can talk about an interregnum. 
The interregnum last until one of the new competing hegemonic projects are strong enough to 
exclude the other alternatives.   
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Table A: Hegemony vs. Interregnums  
 Hegemonic Equilibrium  Interregnum  
Social forces Stable blocs Realignment  
Ideas Consensus Disagreement  
Institutions Stable, gradual innovation Unstable, drift, or gridlock 
Hegemonic Projects One dominant  Several competing  
Political struggle Left vs. right within consensus, 
extensive  
Realignment within blocks, 
intensive 
Political parties Unimportant (consensus) Important, sites of ideological 
struggle 
 
1) Absence of a stable ideological consensus in the elite 
The consensus between the main class and interest groups in society is breaking down, 
and hegemony cannot be maintained. The previous consensus might not have been one of 
active compromise and consent, as in the post-war period but could also be one of class 
dominance and lack of plausible alternatives as during the neoliberal hegemony. As such, 
the breakdown of hegemony might take the form of either the disillusionment of the 
ideological certainties of the previous system or, if this ideological consent was never 
there, the abandonment of the idea that no alternative exists.  
 
2) Presence of several competing hegemonic projects 
While a widespread idea that there is a generalized condition of crisis characterizes an 
interregnum, there are widely differing ideas of how to get out of the crisis. This means 
that there are several competing projects circulating with considerable backing from 
powerful forces in society. This disagreement is not just along the usual axes of left and 
right that characterize normal politics; it often involves a deeper realignment of the 
constituent parts of ruling coalitions and historical blocs.  
 
3) Institutional continuity but decreasing effectiveness of institutions and policies 
The institutions of the previous hegemonic system are still in place, but they are 
increasingly unable to deliver the sort of solutions to policy problems that they previously 
could. The presence of several competing strategies means that no single bloc or coalition 
can overcome resistance to its economic strategy through either marginalization or 
integration of opposing forces. The ensuing gridlock and political conflict might mean 
that there is apparently more institutional stability in some areas because the gradual, 
piecemeal adaptions that take place in a well-ordered hegemonic period are impossible.  
 
4) Realignment of social forces 
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In periods of interregnum, political struggle intensifies, and the presence of several 
competing economic strategies creates new political lines of confrontation. These can 
involve the realignment of social forces into a new ruling coalition and historical blocs 
with factional division within both business and labor. In these periods, political parties 
become more central. In periods of stable hegemony, political parties play a relatively 
minor role when it comes to adjusting relations of production in any meaningful way. Of 
course, there are various ideological positions, but among non-marginalized parties, this 
variation is primarily a rhetorical packaging of the same basic policies. In an interregnum 
period, however, political parties become the site of struggle and can be the site of the 
emergence of new blocs.  
 
 
In contrast to periods of acute crisis, these conditions do not necessarily mean a situation of 
instability and fast-paced change. Some of the ‘morbid symptoms’ can give a perception of 
increased stability as the breakdown of consensus can cause gridlock and prevent the incremental 
innovation and institutional tinkering that is possible in a normal system. In this context, 
however, political parties emerge as more central battlegrounds than in hegemonic periods, with 
the struggle over different strategies often taking place within individual parties or blocs. Periods 
of interregnum begin when the previous hegemony is no longer strong enough to exclude 
alternative hegemonic projects, and last as long as no competing strategies manage to emerge 
victorious with a sufficiently strong bloc of support to exclude or marginalize alternatives 
 
 
A history of interregnums 
 
The following section will describe 20th-century history through the lens of the interregnum, 
focusing specifically on the periods of turmoil and confusion that followed the breakdown of 
previous orders, moving onwards from Gramsci’s observations on the interwar interregnum as 
outlined in the previous sections. In this, it will be shown that both periods of hegemonic 
equilibrium that characterized the late 20th century—the Keynesianism of the post-war period 
and the neoliberalism of the post-1980s period—emerged as one of several hegemonic projects 
in the periods of interregnum, and that hegemonic equilibrium was re-established only after the 
competing projects were eliminated as serious alternatives. A schematic version of this story can 
be seen in table B. 
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Table B: Stylized timeline of hegemonies and interregnums 
 -1914 1917-1939 1945-71 1971-83 1983-
2008 
2008- 
Period Liberal 
Golden 
Age 
Interwar Interregnum Post war 
Settlement  
1970’s 
interregnum 
Neoliberal 
period 
Post-2008 
interregnum  
Hegemonic 
projects 
Hegemony 
of 
classical 
liberalism 
Fascism/Caesarism  
Marxism  
Fordism/Americanism 
 
Keynesian 
hegemony 
Resilient 
Keynesianism  
Neoliberalism 
Socialist 
Reformism 
Neoliberal 
hegemony 
Economic 
Nationalism 
Left populism  
Resilient 
Neoliberalism 
 
 
Of course, such neat periodizations always imply a reduction of the messy reality of the 
historical record. Nevertheless, it seems possible to see a distinct pattern in the historical 
development when viewed through the lens of the concept of interregnum.  
Following Gramsci’s observation of his political time, it is possible to schematize a model of the 
interwar years as an interregnum. In the interwar period, vestiges of the liberal order were still 
there, having survived the destruction of the First World War and the wave of revolution. 
However, international institutions such as the gold standard were not functioning as before, and 
the order was limping along.  
In this chaos, several competing hegemonic projects offered solutions to the crisis—Caesarism 
(Fascism), Marxism, and Fordism (Keynesianism). Gramsci’s position was still embedded in the 
political horizon of the Third International, with the expectation of the imminence of a terminal 
crisis of the capitalist order and, consequently, either the victory of the proletariat and the labor 
movement or the triumph of fascism. Neither of these things happened, however, and instead, a 
new form of capitalist regulation emerged out of the chaos, and his observations can be seen as 
attempts at new modes of reregulation. The post-war period provided a solution to this for the 
core countries in the capitalist world. Based on a globalization of the New Deal liberalism of the 
Roosevelt administration, the US state managed to construct a global economic architecture of 
‘embedded liberalism’, where large parts of the labour movement were integrated into the 
governing elite in Western Europe, while fascism was supressed and revolutionary communism 
contained to a number of relatively peripheral countries. This was the hegemonic equilibrium of 
the post-war period.  
The 1970s interregnum  
The Keynesianism of the post-war period always presented a political compromise. It did not 
comprise a retreat to the economic liberalism and laissez-faire of the pre-war period, but it also 
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did not involve a wholesale nationalization, as many in the labor movement wanted46. Instead, 
labor and capital shared in the rapid productivity gains in the form of rising wages and profits. 
As growth stuttered, however, the compromise and consensus started to fall apart. The economic 
turbulence surfaced with the breakdown of the international financial architecture of the Bretton-
Woods framework in 1971 and reached crisis levels with the oil shocks in 197347. The problems 
had deeper roots, however, in some of the contradictions of the post-war compromise between 
big businesses and large parts of the labor movements. These global developments had great 
implications on a national level. With economic balances already under pressure and the 
emergence of both rising unemployment and inflation, the consensus on economic policies 
shattered, with different strategies emerging on the left and right of the post-war status quo. 
Different hegemonic projects 
The first attempt at dealing with the crisis was to solve the problem of stagflation within the 
Keynesian framework, often with the added use of income policy. By attempting to control 
wages but leaving ownership and investment decisions in private hands, the strategy attempted to 
retain full employment while maintaining the balance of forces and the social compromise of the 
post-war era.  
While income policy had been employed in some countries since the 1960s, it was especially 
after the oil shocks of the 1970s that these policies became an integral part of economic crisis 
management. This was seen in the US, Britain, and Scandinavia48. It was not only center-left 
governments that turned to this strategy in the early 1970s: Nixon in the US did too, and so did 
the conservative Heath government in the UK after an initial unsuccessful attempt at 
liberalization. The strategy of curbing wages through political action was ultimately deemed 
unsuccessful, due to the inability of governments to reach deals with union leadership and the 
inability of union leadership to control membership.  
Alternatives, therefore, emerged to the left and right. At the right, the rise of the neoliberal 
movement is well described. The ideas of neoliberal economic governance had been developed 
in the international networks of academics and political operators around the Mt. Pelerin Society 
since the 1940s49  but gained prominence from the large inflow of corporate money, by a new 
generation of business leaders, and private philanthropist in the 1970s50. The strategy aims to use 
a strict monetary policy to curb inflation and, through temporarily rising unemployment, 
discipline organized labor into accepting downward pressure on wages that would restore 
profitability in private business and, thereby, reinvigorate investment-led growth. These ideas 
moved from the fringes of the political world and onto center stage from the mid-1970s with the 
election of Thatcher as Conservative leader in 1975 and the strengthening and radicalization of 
the Republican right wing from the 1970s onwards51. 
Neoliberalism was not the only economic strategy to address the crisis. On the left, a new form 
of socialist reformism was also on the rise through the 1970s. This was either a result of a 
radicalization of demands by the main center-left parties or a formation of new alliances on the 
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left, allowing for the unity of center- and far-left. The general idea of the programmes was to use 
a higher level of socialization and planning as a way out of the impasse of stagflation and low-
level investment. This meant that the issue of ownership of industry and the role of state 
planning in the economy was suddenly reopened after having been dormant since the war.  
There were several different models of reformism. Some, like the Eurocommunist of Italy or 
Mitterrand’s Programme Commun of the 1981 election, proposed the use of nationalization to 
secure a higher level of investment in key industries, while a form of ‘redistributive 
Keynesianism’ would secure full employment52. In the UK, the Alternative Economic Strategy 
was based on securing a higher level of productivity growth in key industries through 
nationalization and government direction of investments53, while the labor movements of 
Scandinavia pushed for wage-earner funds as a way of gradually taking over ownership of 
industrial enterprises by labor, as stipulated in the Meidner plan that was adopted by the Swedish 
Trade Unions in 197854. In some countries, however, these programmes remained marginal—
most notably in the US and Germany, where labor was never sufficiently strong or radical. The 
weakness in the US proved especially critical because of the central role of US government in 
the post-war period. 
 
Table C: Hegemonic projects in 1970s interregnum 
Hegemonic project Accumulation 
Strategy 
State form  Economic policies 
Resilient 
Keynesianism 
Fordist capitalism  Welfare state Income policy 
Keynesian demand 
management 
Neoliberalism Financialised 
capitalism 
Liberal workfare 
state 
Financial and labor market 
liberalization 
Trade and FDI 
globalization  
Socialist Reformism State-led 
Industrialization, mixed 
economy 
Interventionist 
welfare state 
Nationalization 
Wage-earner funds 
Capital controls 
 
 
Eventual triumph of neoliberalism  
In most countries, the immediate policy reaction to the economic downturn of the 1970s was to 
employ the conventional instruments of Keynesian demand management and attempts to use 
income policies of varying strictness to keep wage and price increases in check. These strategies, 
however, became increasingly untenable as coordination and compromise between labor and 
capital became harder to reach. In Britain, for instance, the strategy effectively died in 1976 
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when the Labour government essentially surrendered to IMF demands for monetarist policies55. 
In other countries, these attempts proved more long-lived, but with the US turn to monetarism 
and increasing pressure from international organizations such as the OECD and IMF for 
financial liberalization, it proved harder and harder to sustain the national Keynesian policies56. 
Interestingly, the radical alternatives of socialist reformism in many places proved more 
enduring than the centrist models. Especially in Scandinavia, Britain, and France, the 1970s saw 
a radical turn of central parts of the center-left. However, these national strategies eventually 
faltered. In hindsight, 1983 proved a decisive year in which the last advocates of alternative 
strategies to neoliberalism were defeated in Britain and France. The same year was marked by a 
U-turn by Mitterrand who, under pressure from capital flight and the international financial 
markets, abandoned his policy of redistributive socialism in favor of a programme of austerity 
and liberalization. This development was cemented by later socialist governments57. In Britain, 
the interregnum ended after the 1983 election with Labour’s defeat in the polls and subsequent 
abandonment of any ambition of industrial policy and the Alternative Economic Programme. In 
Scandinavia, the early 1980s signified the end of all ambitious programmes of wage-earner funds 
as economic strategies. In Denmark, the project was buried by the newly ascended conservative 
government, while the wage-earner funds in Sweden were implemented in a watered-down 
version with little impact on the economy58. 
It is possible to see similarities between the interwar and 1970s. This lies in the inability of the 
institutional order to solve the contradictions it faced and division among elites around which 
strategy to take in dealing with this crisis. According to the definition laid out, the 1970s have all 
four characteristics: lack of consensus, political dysfunction, realignment of social forces, and 
the presence of several competing projects. This situation of interregnum meant chaos and crisis, 
but also increasing political openness following the slow collapse of previous hegemonic 
ideologies. Moreover, while the neoliberal hegemonic project ended up successful, this did not 
mean there were no viable alternatives in the period. Looking back from today, it does not seem 
as though Rudolf Meidner or Stuart Holland provided less credible solutions to the crisis than 
Milton Friedman and Patrick Minford. Focusing on these defeated alternatives reveals the 
contingencies for the current era.  
 
The post-2008 interregnum 
The end of the 1970s interregnum ushered in a 25-year period of neoliberal dominance. With the 
defeat or domestication of organized labor in the 1980s and 1990s and the rise of the pro-
business leaders of the third-way social democracies59, no alternatives could muster major 
support in the period. This situation changed with the advent of the financial crisis of 2007-8. As 
stated in the introduction, a large body of post-crisis literature argues that this crisis was solved 
within neoliberal parameters and that the hegemonic equilibrium was re-established in the wake 
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of the crisis. I will argue, however, that in this apparent institutional stability it is possible to see 
the indications of deeper problems, and that the current period can more productively be 
analyzed as a new period of interregnum as developed above. The start of the interregnum is set 
at the 2008 crisis, as this marked the beginning of the legitimation crisis of neoliberalism and the 
system lost the ideological legitimacy to exclude and marginalize alternatives.  
 
On the material level, the recovery after the crisis has been anemic at best, furthering a trend 
towards stagnating growth rates that have been evident for decades60. Another sign of problems 
for neoliberal globalization is that the rise of global trade and capital flows are facing a secular 
slowdown61, pointing to an increasing institutional dysfunctionality and inability to produce 
earlier results. On the ideological level, there seems to be a growing division among ruling elites 
in which the neoliberal consensus has been superseded by increasing disagreement and 
confusion. In the institutional sphere, negotiations around international trade deals such as the 
TPP, CETA, or TTIP, which were otherwise seen as means of invigorating trade and growth, 
have stranded62. Intellectually, the growing uncertainty can be seen in recent warnings of rising 
inequality from the research groups of IMF and OECD or talks at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos63. This is especially evident in the 2016 IMF publication “Neoliberalism: Oversold”, 
which suggests that two main tenets of the neoliberal agenda—unrestricted capital mobility and 
the purposeful attempt to limit the size of government through privatization and fiscal 
orthodoxy—have, in fact, not brought growth but rather increased inequality and instability64. 
 
At the same time, the rise of anti-establishment politics all over the developed world seems to 
usher in a new period of political instability, and loss of legitimacy for the political 
establishment. This anti-establishment wave started with a surge of popular mobilization in 2011, 
where the protest of the Arab Spring started a cycle of mobilization with global reach65. The 
intensity of these movements peaked in the 2011-13 period, with the anti-austerity protest in 
Southern Europe and Occupy Wall Street in the US, but many of the activist since went into new 
electoral formation such as Podemos, La France Insoumise or new movement within existing 
parties, backing figures like Corbyn or Sanders.  At the same time the 2015 refugee crisis saw 
the rise of popular mobilization on the right as well, with the Pegida protest66, and new 
momentum for the radical right, as witnessed in the recent rise of Alternative für Deutschland. In 
late 2018 the ‘Yellow Vest’ movement in France seemed to reignite the sort economically 
focused protest seen earlier, in a movement that have shaken the Macron presidency.  
 
I will argue that it is possible to outline three distinct hegemonic projects in this increasingly 
volatile political landscape and that each points to different solutions to the increasing 
contradictions. Those projects are Left Populism, Economic Nationalism, and Austerity 
Neoliberalism. 
 
Left populism   
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The primary surge of left populism emerged out of the wave of street movements such as M15 
and Occupy Wall Street that swept the world in 2011. In the last years, these movements have 
increasingly transformed towards an institutionalized and party-political form and moved 
hitherto marginal positions into the political mainstream coming close to state power. This 
movement has taken two forms. The first is the rise of new parties on the far left such as Syriza 
and Podemos. The second is the takeover of traditional centrist parties by new leaders carried 
into power by a new generation of more radical members, as in the case of Corbyn’s Labour or 
Sanders presidential campaign. In contrast to earlier generations of the left movements, such as 
the global justice movement of the late 1990s, who, inspired by thinkers like Hardt and Negri67, 
kept a distance from state and formal politics these new left formations have an explicit aim at 
taking state power by electoral means. This not only entails a redefinition of the view of the 
state, but also the need for developing political platform for a left programme with the potential 
of building hegemonic coalitions68. The paradigmatic party of this new generation is perhaps 
Podemos in Spain, who, directly inspired by the works of Ernesto Laclau, has developed a 
political language of left populism beyond traditional left-right69. While the political demands of 
this new generation of left populists are not especially radical in comparison to the reformist left 
of the 1970s, these parties nevertheless present a clear break from the neoliberal consensus of the 
last decades, and leaders such as Iglesias and Corbyn present political visions that transcend 
capitalism in the longer term70. The clearest formulation of a new economic project for 
transcending neoliberal capitalism probably comes from the Labour Party in the UK. Here 
Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell, explicitly citing Marxist and post-Keynesian economics, 
has outlined an economic strategy with elements such as wage-led growth and creation of 
alternate ownership forms through nationalizations and employee-owned firms as well as an 
openness towards restriction on capital mobility71. The greatest institutional successes so far has 
been in Southern Europe, but the exact nature of the economic strategy of the left populist is still 
relatively indeterminate, especially after the Syriza government’s failure to confront the Troika. 
If the wave of movement-based left populism will prove successful in the long run, the parties 
need to develop strategies for using their bases in national politics to face and transform the 
constraints of free global capital mobility and the pressures of financial markets. 
 
 
Economic Nationalism 
Another alternative to the neoliberal strategy, Economic Nationalism72, is emerging on the right 
of the political spectrum with the rise of right populist or xenophobic parties, such as Front 
National in France, AfD in Germany or Lega Nord in Italy. While large parts of these parties 
have few concrete economic policies, influential factions in these new parties represent a clear 
break with central tenets of neoliberalism73. Economic nationalism can be seen as an attempt at 
national economic revival with a focus on domestic, industrial production that has suffered under 
neoliberal globalization. Often these movements are described as populist, but on the economic 
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area, the ideas presented, can rarely be seen as economic populism, with assumptions of 
redistribution and egalitarian policies74. 
 In contrast to left populism, this project of economic nationalism represents a clear pro-capitalist 
strategy, promising jobs to the domestic working class, through pro-business policies. There is, 
however, a break with neoliberalism on several crucial issues. Most obviously the issue of free 
movement of labor, where the nativist proclivities of economic nationalist leads them to offer 
closing of borders, as a way of shielding domestic workers from wage competition with 
immigrants. There are two other, less obvious, examples, namely world trade and the 
discretionary role of the state. Neoliberalism implies governance through laws and rules rather 
than government discretion – in effect the de-politicization of decisions on economic policy75. It 
is exactly this de-politicization that Economic Nationalism challenges. The paradigmatic 
example of the break with the orthodoxies of neoliberalism is the Trump campaign and the Front 
National in France76. In both cases, there is opposition to free trade and the right of companies to 
relocate production, as signaled in the cancellation by the Trump administration of the TTP 
treaty or the opposition of the Front National to the EU and the Common Market. The issues of 
free trade and especially free capital mobility have been a cornerstone of global neoliberalism for 
four decades, but is now being challenged. Especially Trumps threats of trade wars and attack on 
the rules-based trade structure of the WTO77. The potential turn of the US towards a more 
nationalist stance can prove especially decisive. Since 1945 the US state has put itself up as a 
guarantor of not only domestic capital, but also of international capitalism, stepping in to solve 
crisis on a global and not just domestic level78. By rescinding this role and explicitly prioritizing 
domestic over foreign capital, an economically nationalist Administration in the US can have 
strong disruptive consequences for global capital flows. These can be much stronger than any 
direct effect of tariffs or other overt policy measures. 
 
It remains to be seen whether this alliance between domestic business and disaffected working- 
and middleclass voters can be sustained in the long run. It is hard to see the pro-business, anti-
globalization platform deliver on promises of better conditions for workers, or efforts mitigate 
the economic insecurities engendered by neoliberal globalization. Nevertheless, with the 
slowdown in trade and controversies around institutions such as EU and the global trade 
infrastructure, parts of manufacturing capital might find an economically nationalist strategy 
attractive. 
 
 
Austerity Neoliberalism  
Despite the loss of legitimacy and the threat from insurgent policies, the neoliberal policy 
framework is still in place in most countries. This entails a general continuation of the structural 
reforms of the last decades and strict austerity in fiscal policy in combination with unorthodox 
monetary policies carried out by independent central banks79. The results here have largely been 
a downward pressure on wages—a tendency furthered by further precarisation of labor market 
22 
 
conditions in many countries, a situation it is hoped will re-stimulate growth through revived 
competitiveness of industry80. 
 
The governing mode of neoliberalism is also changed in the interregnum. The previous duopoly, 
with the ‘cartel parties’ of left and right neoliberalism, are under dissolution in most countries81. 
This is due to pressures from anti-establishment parties, as with Podemos or Front National, or 
the defection of parties or factions of parties from the neoliberal programme, as with Corbyn or 
Trump. This has led to new forms of governance as a grand coalition between otherwise opposed 
political forces, as in Germany, or in France, where Macron in his own words had to create a 
political revolution and destroy both establishment parties to get through a relatively standard 
neoliberal policy package, of labor market deregulation and corporate tax cuts82. 
 
 
Table D: Hegemonic projects in post-2008 interregnum 
Hegemonic project Accumulation 
Strategy 
State form  Economic policies 
Austerity 
neoliberalism 
Low wage, 
financialised capitalism  
Reduced workfare 
state 
Fiscal austerity,  
Trade liberalization 
(bilateral) 
Precarisation of labor  
Economic 
Nationalism 
National-industrial 
capitalism 
National competition 
state 
Protectionism  
National deregulation 
Pro-business state 
intervention 
Left Populism Wage-led growth, 
mixed economy  
Welfare state  Financial regulation  
Limited nationalizations 
Redistributive tax reforms 
 
Comparisons with earlier interregnums 
As noted above, the current period fits the definition of interregnum laid out in this article: lack 
of consensus, political dysfunction, and competing hegemonic projects and a reconfiguration of 
social forces. .When comparing to the last interregnum in the 1970s, both the crisis of the 
capitalist economy and the crisis of political legitimacy seem deeper in the post-2008 world. 
Growth rates are lower, recoveries more anemic, and the living conditions of people in the 
Western world have been much more adversely affected83. However, at the same time, the 
alternatives to the neoliberalism seem to be weaker and with less backing than was the case with 
the alternative hegemonic projects that emerged out of the 1970s interregnum.  
 
The question remains, however, what such a conclusion means for an analysis of the current 
conjuncture. There are several implications. The first is a notion that the apparent lack of 
institutional and ideational change after the 2008 crisis does not necessarily mean the 
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entrenchment of neoliberalism. Rather, it can be a sign of gridlock and the inability of the 
political establishment to implement the form of gradual reform that characterizes periods of 
greater political stability. It may further signal that the current political discontent might not go 
away anytime soon and, coupled with fissures in the governing elite, may signal as well that we 
can expect further instability before a form of hegemonic equilibrium, possibly, is re-established. 
In crucial aspects, the interregnum in the present period is deeper than in the 1970s, because we 
are not only witnessing a crisis of economic strategies, but also of core institutions of 
representative democracy. In this way the current interregnum has more parallels to the interwar 
years, than to the 1970s, where the political institutions were relatively unchanged,  although 
neoliberal governance in the preceding decades have gradually hollowed large parts of national 
democracies84. Now however, constitutional elements play a central role in all of the emergent 
economic strategies. In the strategy of resilient neoliberalism, the ability to please financial 
markets and international institutions on expense of popular wishes remains a central part of the 
success of the project. This has meant an increasing narrowing of the space of democratic 
politics, in order to force through the perceived necessary economic reforms. This was seen in 
EU by the de-facto administration of disobedient southern European governments at the height 
of the euro crisis in 2010-12, and by constraining the national policy space by the financial 
pact85. At the present seem to be an inability of classical center-right and center-left 
representatives to win popular majorities for continuation of the neoliberal program, as witnessed 
by the defeat of Hillary Clinton, Matteo Renzi, or the present problem for Emmanuel Macron. 
This points to a situation where a successful continuation of the neoliberal strategy is dependent 
on some form of restriction of national democracy. 
 
The constitutional element also plays a role in the insurgent strategies. In left populism this is 
framed as defending democratic sovereignty and opposing oligarchic and elite encroachment of 
national democracy. This is seen in the importance of the opposition to the Troika for Syriza, for 
The Billionaire Class for Bernie Sanders or La Casta for Podemos. The issue of direct 
democracy also plays a large role for Podemos, Italy’s Five Star Movement or the pirate parties 
of northern Europa86. In Economic nationalism it is the issue of the strong man, and reclaiming 
of national sovereignty against culturally foreign influences. The aim here is not deepening 
democracy, but restoring a perception of lost sovereignty, this was seen in the slogans such as 
“take back control” or “Make America Great Again”. Despite populist rhetoric it does not seem 
that the idea of economic nationalism will mean a diminishing role of the current oligarchy. The 
Trump administration seems to be filled with associates of oligarchic affiliates, with ties to 
entities such as Goldman Sachs or the Koch Brothers political empire, to an even greater extent 
than earlier administrations. The difference between the two forms of insurgent strategies lies in 
the form of sovereignty they want to institute. For the economic nationalist strategy it is national 
sovereignty as opposed to foreign influence and competing nations. For Left Populism it is 
popular sovereignty, as opposed to the elite, a notion that is not tied to the idea of the nation or 
ethnos, but encompasses all inhabitants of the country.  
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The situation of interregnum also means a greater political openness and possibility for political 
alternatives than under the functioning hegemonic equilibrium. The fact that non-neoliberal 
parties have a chance of taking power in central countries in the coming years means a distinct 
widening of the scope of political discussion and contestation. This furthermore means that 
political parties potentially take on a more central role in the years to come as the vehicles of 
new hegemonic projects. This represents a break in trends noted by Colin Crouch and Peter Mair 
related to the increasing irrelevance of political parties under the neoliberal period87. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has described and operationalized the Gramscian notion of the interregnum from the 
Prison Notebooks. The concept of interregnum developed in the article offers a new theoretical 
tool for understanding the situation of a capitalist economy without functioning ideological 
hegemony.  In this way, the concept offers a new perspective on the current conjunctures in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis as well as the long processes that generally follow the breakdown of 
an ideational hegemony. 
The concept of interregnum challenges the idea of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, which dominates 
large parts of the scholarship on the relation between crisis and social and ideological change. 
This idea holds that history develops in plateaus of stability punctuated by short critical junctures 
characterized by rapid change. Instead, the article has argued that these ‘punctuation’ between 
hegemonic equilibriums often constitute lengthy periods. These periods of interregnum must be 
understood as historical periods in their own right and analyzed on their own terms, 
characterized by political instability and competing hegemonic projects. 
This approach opens up for an analysis of the current conjuncture that transcends the dichotomy 
between seeing neoliberal hegemony as either being in a terminal crisis or having already 
overcome the crisis. By using the concept of interregnum, the article has an alternative lens, 
where the full effects of the crisis of legitimacy of neoliberalism are not yet fully unfolded. The 
analysis offered in the article points to a scenario where a situation of instability and competing 
hegemonic projects can last for decades before a resolution is found. In a broader theoretical 
context, the article also contributes to the discussion of the use of history in social science, and 
especially the prevalence of the model of ‘punctuated equilibria’. While the periodization of 
history into discrete epochs and periods can be useful and productive for developing clear 
theoretical arguments, there are also dangers connected to squeezing the historical record into a 
set of consecutive paradigms, epochs, or modes of regulation. Doing this often requires a 
retrospective way of seeing in which the focus is on tracing the genealogy of subsequently 
successful projects—be it Keynesianism or neoliberalism. While this approach has yielded great 
insights, it also tends to obscure the other potentially viable projects that were available at the 
time. By focusing on the specific dynamics of ideological contestation between competing 
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hegemonic projects that characterize periods of interregnum, the article has tried to draw 
attention to these unsuccessful projects. This offers a view of history that is more in line with 
how the actors at the time envisaged it and also draws attention to the openness and contingency 
of historical processes, where alternative avenues were always available.  
To conclude, the current interregnum seems to mirror the situation of the 1970s and the interwar 
year, in that the previous ideational and institutional hegemony have broken down. This means 
that central institutions are longer able to deliver the legitimacy and stability they previously 
could, and have lost the ability to ensure both popular consent and elite consensus. This situation 
however, does not mean that the old regime is replaced by a new. Instead we have several 
competing strategies vying for hegemony. Despite the analogies to the 1970s the crisis of both 
the capitalist economy and state seems deeper in the post-2008 world. Growth rates are lower, 
economic woes greater and the crisis of political legitimacy is greater. What aggravates the crisis 
is the explosion to the surface of the brewing tension between capitalism and democracy. This 
means that the political conjuncture is more open and chaotic now than it has been in decades.  
Not only when it comes to the issues of economic production and distribution, but also of the 
very foundation of democratic representation. This has led some authors to ask whether the 
political instability of the interregnum heralds the beginning of the unravelling of capitalism as 
such88. Wolfgang Streeck specifically describes our period as a “post-capitalist interregnum”89. 
In contrast to Streeck however, this article have argued that this interregnum of economic and 
political instability, should not necessarily be taken to signal the end of capitalism. While the 
increasing political volatility, indeed, opens greater space for alternatives, looking at the history 
of 20th century capitalism through the lens of the interregnum reveals that turbulence and 
instability are as natural a state for the capitalist world economy as stable hegemony. If we 
should draw one lesson from history, it is the astonishing ability of capitalism to overcome crisis, 
transform itself and emerge in new institutional forms. 
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